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BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE TO DISMISS SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE SUITS AGAINST DIRECTORS
In today's corporate arena, shareholders who challenge director authority

through derivative suits may find that the directors are empowered to dismiss
these suits on the grounds that such actions are not in the best interests of the
corporation. Two conflicting but nonetheless co-existing principles have led to

this result.' First, shareholders have traditionally expressed dissatisfaction with
corporate decisions through the medium of shareholder derivative suits. 2 At the
same time, the business judgment rule8 has protected corporate directors from
judicial scrutiny and personal liability for honest errors and mistakes of judgment made in good faith.4 The developing trend in the federal courts, has been
to allow corporate directors to use the business judgment rule to terminate
derivative suits by merely asserting that the suit would not be in the best interests of the corporation.5 This trend, if left unchecked, could easily erode the use
1. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1222 (1977).
2. This is not to suggest that this is the only recourse available to shareholders. Many
jurisdictions allow more drastic measures such as removal of the antagonistic directors with
cause or even without cause. See, e.g., DL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(k) (1980); FLA. STAT.
§607.117(1) (1979). See generally H. BALLANTiNE, CORPORATIONS §145 (rev. ed. 1946); W. CART,
CASES AND MATERIS ON CORPORATrIONS 868-1006 (4th ed. 1978); 13 W. FLErcHm, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW or PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoNs §§5939-6045 (1943); R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §§167-68

(2d ed. 1949).
3. Although it is hard to find a precise, all encompassing definition of the business judgment rule, it has been stated as follows: "Mhe law will not hold directors liable for honest
errors for mistakes of judgment, when they act without corrupt motive and in good faith, that
is, for mistakes which may properly be classified under the heading of honest mistakes. This
is true even though the errors may be so gross that they may demonstrate the unfitness of the
directors to manage the corporate affairs." 3 W. F.rTCHr,
supra note 2 §1030. See also Note,
The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for JudicialRestraint,
35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 562, 562-63 (1967).
4. The business judgment rule grew principally from the judicial concern that persons of
reason, intellect, and integrity would not serve as directors if the law exacted from them a
degree of prescience not possessed by people of ordinary knowledge. Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 97 (1979). Perhaps the earliest expression of
the business judgment rule in America is found in the 1829 Louisianaiupreme court decision
of Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (ns.) 68 (La. 1829). The rule quickly became popular in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847); Hodges v. New England
Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850).
The business judgment rule protects directors and officers from personal liability for
honest business decisions made in good faith even where such decisions result in substantial
loss to the corporation. In effect, the rule prohibits shareholders from second-guessing the
directors. The court in Hodges stated: "We think a Board of Directors acting in good faith
and with xeasonable care and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either as to law
or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such mistake." Id. at 18. See generally 3
W. FLETcHER, supra note 2, § 1030.
5. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1017 (1980) (applying Delaware law); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir.
1979) (applying California law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (applying Delaware law); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
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of the derivative suit as one of the most effective restraints upon abusive corporate dealings. 6
Generally, dissatisfied shareholders must request that the board of directors
redress alleged grievances before a derivative suit will be permitted. 7 Directors
increasingly use a two-step process to determine whether the corporation should
judicially pursue these grievances. Where the majority of the board of directors
is accused of wrongdoing," the board first transfers the complaint to a special
litigation committee 9 composed of disinterested directors.1 0 The committee
then investigates the shareholders' allegations and determines whether a suit
is in the corporation's best interests." In all reported instances, these special
litigation committees have found that the derivative suit was not in the best
interests of the corporation and have voted to terminate the action. 12 The federal courts tend to view these committee decisions as legitimate exercises of
corporate business judgment. Consequently, shareholder challenges to committee determinations have proven unsuccessful because the federal courts apply
the business judgment rule as a bar to judicial scrutiny of committee decisions.' 3
(applying Delaware law). But cf. Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.), 444 F. Supp.
973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dismissal denied due to lack of disinterestedness of acting director
committee).
6. See generally Prunty, The Stockholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U.L. REV. 980 (1957).
7. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at §5963. See text accompanying notes 20-24 infra.
8. It is important to note that there are basically two types of shareholder derivative
suits: suits against the directors and suits against third parties. This note deals primarily
with the problems that result when the distinction between these types of suits is not taken
into account. Very different results may occur when both types of suits are treated the same.
In actions against corporate directors, courts are beginning to realize the increased danger of
placing the fate of the suits "in the hands of those who stand to benefit most from its termination". Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CoRNF.LL
L. REv. 600, 605 (1980). As the court in In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 269
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), stated: "[It] [is] hard to imagine that a director...
who had participated . . . in a major transaction, albeit for a corporate purpose, would authorize a suit, effectively against himself, claiming that the transaction violated the federal
antitrust laws."
9. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Ct. App. 1979).
10. These committ'es are theoretically composed of disinterested directors, but the ability
of such directors to be truly impartial has been questioned by commentators. See text accompanying notes 71-82 infra.
11. Compare Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (where a four month
investigation was conducted) with S.E.C. v. Zale Corp., S.E.C. Litigation Release No. 8081
(N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd No. 9132 (5th Cir. 1981) (where the S.E.C. concluded the investigation
had been a mere sham). See also Coffee, supra note 1, at 1236.
12. Note, supra note 8, at 602. This statement refers to all reported cases where the decision to litigate was found to exist in the board of directors or a committee thereof. Not
included are cases like Nussbacher v. Chase Manhatten Bank (N.A.), 444 F. Supp. 973, 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court found the directors did not possess the requisite disinterestedness to make the decision.
13. See text accompanying notes 41-50 infra. Only two reported cases have specifically
disagreed with the trend. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1980) and
Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254-55 (Del. Ch. 1980).
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This note will examine both the business judgment rule and the shareholder
derivative suit in an attempt to clarify their functions in the corporate legal
structure. This note will also discuss the current federal trend in applying the
business judgment rule to shareholder derivative actions. Consideration will be
given to the courts' attitude towards the special litigation committee as a substitute for the full board of directors when it is determined that board members may be involved in the actions complained of. Finally, this note will examine the misapplication of the business judgment rule by the federal courts
and will suggest alternative methods of balancing the competing corporate
policies.
SHAREHoLDER DERIVATIVE SuITs

Generally, the corporation alone has standing to sue for actionable wrongs
committed against it.'14 The shareholder derivative suit's is an exception to this
principle in that the shareholder is permitted to assert a claim based upon a
wrong done to the corporation rather than a wrong solely affecting the individual shareholder. 6 Although the corporation is sued as a nominal defendant and an indispensible party,' 7 the true defendant is either a third party
or the corporation's management. Consequently, the derivative action has been
the minority shareholders' principal weapon with which to attack improper
acts of corporate decision-makers.' 8
14. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917)
(whether or not a corporation chooses to enforce a cause of action is, like other business
questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management left to the discretion of the board of
directors).
15. The basis of our present day derivative suit was established in England. For a complete discussion of the origins of the shareholder derivative suit, see generally Prutney, supra
note 6.
16. Minority shareholders may bring a derivative action no matter how small their stock
holdings are. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 318-19 (1935):
"Stockholders otherwise entitled to bring a suit ... will not be denied relief because of the
smallness of their holdings." Id.
There are other, more limited methods of shareholder protection besides the derivative
suit. One method is the displacement of unfriendly directors through either proxy solicitations
or elections, or through formal removal procedures. This process, however, can be quite expensive and time consuming and is useless where the shareholders are in a minority position.
Another option is simply the sale of one's investment in the corporation. Such an option,
however, might result in extensive losses to the shareholder or may in some cases be impossible due to the lack of a buyer.
17. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 19(b) which states that, "[i]f a person ... cannot be made a party,
the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person thus regarded as indispensible." See also F. JAmEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 133 (2d ed. 1977).
It has been pointed out that the major reason the corporation's presence is required is to
eliminate the possibility of a double recovery. Prunty, supra note 6, at 989. See generally Note,
Defenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits -Who May Raise Them?, 66 HARv. L. Rlv. 342
(1952).
18. See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 77-82 (1967);
Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Cm.
L. Rzv. 168, 168 (1967).
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Because both federal and state courts have regarded the derivative suit as
an extraordinary remedy, 19 shareholders are permitted to bring suit on behalf
of the corporation only where there is "no other road to address. ' ' 20 Therefore,
the shareholder must demand that the corporation redress shareholder com22
plaints before the shareholder can bring suit.21 This demand requirement
serves to notify the directors of the alleged cause of action and to give them the
opportunity to pursue the action in the corporate name.2 3 Furthermore, the
demand requirement informs the shareholders of the directors' refusal to sue.24
An exception to the demand requirement exists where the stockholder shows
If a shareholder can show that he has sustained damages unique to himself rather than
damages common to many or all of the shareholders as a class, he may bring a direct suit
against the wrongdoers. Thus, given the right factual situation, a shareholder might elect the
alternative of a direct suit as well as a derivative one. See generally Note, Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Suits. 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 191, 30 S.W.2d 976, 978 (1980).
20. See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative
Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748-49 (1960).
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 which states: "The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the
reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort."
Additional protection is afforded the corporation and its directors by the requirement that
the plaintiff fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders similarly situated. Id.
22. In Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61, the United States Supreme Court stated,
"[the shareholder] should show, to the satisfaction of the court, that he has exhausted all the
means within his reach to obtain, within the corporation itself, the redress for his grievance
or action in conformity to his wishes." The court emphasized that the effort must not merely
be "simulated" but must be an "earnest effort". Id. at 461. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 now requires
that this effort be set out with particularity in the complaint. The court in Hawes further
stated that: "[i]f time permits or has permitted, he must show, if he fails with the directors,
... 104
that he has made an honest effort to obtain action by the stockholders as a body.
U.S. at 461. The court further required that if this demand was not made upon the shareholders, good reason must be shown. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 requires a demand on shareholders "if necessary." There is some confusion as to what "if necessary" actually means.
Professor Moore has argued that the phrase, which was apparently adapted from Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881), meant to incorporate state law on whether shareholders
can ratify fraud. 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 1123.1.19 at 23.1-95-96 (2d ed. 1980). For a
critique of the Moore view see Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited JudicialReview, 63 COLUM. L. RjEv. 1086, 1090 n.36 (1963). The
rule applied by most courts concerning demand on shareholders is that state law will control.
Some states have adopted the demand on shareholders requirement, some have not. Compare
ARIZ. R. Civ. P. §23.1 and MINN. R. Civ. P. §23.1 (requiring demand on shareholders) with
CAL. CORP. CODE §834 (West 1955) and N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §626(c) (McKinney 1963) (no
demand requirement).
For an example of the extent to which courts require demand on the directors compare
Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (liberal approach) with In re Kauffman
Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973) (strict approach).
23. The main purpose of the demand rule "is to give the derivative corporation itself
the opportunity to take over a suit which was brought on its behalf in the first place, and
thus to allow the directors the chance to occupy their normal status as conductors of the
corporation's affairs." Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. See Note, supra note 20, at 748-49.
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that such demand would be futile because of director self-interest. 25 Traditionally, allegations of fraud, collusion, dishonesty, or breach of trust suffice to
6
render demand futile.2
THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RuLE

It is a well settled doctrine of corporate law that the board of directors is
empowered to make the business decisions of the corporation. 27 In order to
protect and further this power it is necessary that corporate directors be free
to exercise their good-faith discretion in managing business affairs. 28 Hence, the
business judgment rule developed defensively- 9 to shield a diligent director
from personal liability should certain business decisions later prove improvident.3 0
25. Futility is a term of art left undefined by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the practitioner must consult relevant state case law in seeking to define the term. See
In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 261 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973). The United States Supreme Court in Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905) held
that control of the board of directors by a malfactor is enough to excuse demand even without facts adducing how this control was obtained or exerted. Arguably, all that is required is
a prima facie showing of facts such that "[e]very sensible man, out of a court of justice, knows
[that a demand under the circumstances] would never be complied with." In re Penn Central
Sec. Litigation, 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (quoting Young v. Alhambia Mining
Co., 71 F. 810, 812 (N.D. Del. 1895).
26. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). See also Swanson v.
Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 116 (1957); Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co.,
243 Iowa 1007, 1083, 51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952); Outing v. Plum, 212 Iowa 1169, 1171, 235
N.W. 559, 560 (1931); First Nat'l Bank v. Fireproof Co., 199 Iowa 1285, 1294, 202 N.W. 14, 18

(1925).
27. Courts and commentators have not agreed on an exact definition of the business
judgment rule. See, e.g., Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 243-44 (D. Neb.
1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1973); Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 61 F. Supp.
905, 910-11 (ED. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del.
Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See also Lewis, The Business Judgment
Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1970);
Uhlman, The Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise Business Judgment, 20 B.U.L. Rlv.
488 (1940); Note, The Business Judgment Rule and the Declaration of Corporate Dividends:
A Reappraisal,4 HorrRA L. Rxv. 73 (1975).
A fairly complete definition of the rule is given as follows: "A corporate transaction that
involves no self-dealing by, or other personal interest of, the directors who authorized the
transaction will not be enjoined or set aside for the directors' failure to satisfy the standards
that govern a director's performance of his or her duties, and directors who authorized the
transaction will not be held personally liable for resultant damage, unless: (1) the directors
did not exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and available facts before voting to authorize the transaction; or (2) the directors voted to authorize the transaction even though
they did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed the transaction to be
for the best interest of the corporation; or (3)in some other way the directors' authorization
of the transaction was not in good faith." Arsht, supra note 4, at 111-12.
28. See 3A W. FrzrcHmt, supra note 2, at §1039.
29. The defensive nature of the rule is of doubtful validity when the rule is used to
allow directors to dismiss derivative suits. This unusual prospective application of the rule is
not unanimously agreed upon. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1256-62 (Del. Ch.
1980), where the court found the prospective use a misapplication.
30. See Arsht, supra note 4, at 97-100. The primary function of the business judgment
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The adherence to the underlying premises of the business judgment rule
are crucial for the effective operation of both the modern business community
and the judiciary.31 The rule recognizes that despite the utmost display of good
faith, directors are not infallible a2 Furthermore, if every corporate transaction
was subject to judicial review, both business entities and the courts would continuously be involved in evaluating the soundness of financial decisions33 The
business judgment rule, therefore, establishes a standard 4 flexible enough to
allow broad leeway for the vagaries of the human decision-making process.3"
The business judgment rule does not insulate all corporate directors' actions
from challenge.36 Rather, directors are required to exercise the utmost loyalty to
the corporation.37 The rule is inapplicable when the directors have profited at
the corporation's expense,3 or when they have made fraudulent, illegal or reckrule is to give the directors the same protection enjoyed by other professionals, such as doctors
and lawyers, when they are sued for tortious malpractice. Id. at 97.
31. These underlying principles are not the subject of current concern. As one commentator noted: "If the business judgment rule has at times appeared to excuse deplorable
behavior, it has not been because the rule licenses such behavior, but because in such instances either the plaintiff failed to establish the facts necessary to make the defense inapplicable or the then prevailing standards of conduct did not warrant, in the eyes of the
court, the imposition of liability under the developed facts." Id. at 96. The commentator,
however, overlooks one other reason why the rule may appear inequitable. That is, the
court may simply misapply the rule.
32. The business judgment rule is founded upon an awareness and understanding of
human nature. See, e.g., Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 201 (1847); Percy v. Millaudon,
8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 76-77 (La. 1829).
The rule is also designed to take into account the need for economy and efficiency in both
the courts and industry. See, e.g., Karsik v. Pacific Elec. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 97, 180 A. 604,
611 (1935); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A. 654, 659 (1928).
It should be noted that in the vast majority of day to day decisions the business judgment
rule is more pertinent to the officers of a corporation than to its directors. Although the directors are included in the general duty of decision making, the officers have far more occasion to exercise their business judgment on even the most trivial of decisions. Almost without exception, the courts have applied the business judgment rule equally to both officers
and directors so long as they act within their powers. See Bayne, The Fiduciary Duty of
Management -The Concept in the Courts, 35 U. DET. LJ. 561, 573-75 (1958).
33. According to the United States Supreme Court, directors are not obligated to pursue
all causes of action and may justifiably waive a legal right vested in the corporation in the
belief that the corporation's best interests will be served by not litigating. Corbus v. Alaska
Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903). In Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di
Credito Finanzario-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court concluded
that if this were not the case, litigious shareholders with whatever small holdings, could bring
a derivative action after the board had determined the action not to be in the corporation's
best interests.
34. The flexibility of the business judgment standard is analogous to the reasonable man
principle used in tort. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, §1030. See also Note, supra note 3, at 562.
35. See Arsht, supra note 4, at 97-100.
36. See Note, supra note 3, at 562-63.
37. See Arsht, supra note 4, at 115-33. Whether a director has maintained a sufficient degree of loyalty to the corporation will vary from court to court. Compare Harman v. Willbern,
520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975), with McDonell v. American Leduc Petrol., Ltd., 491 F.2d 380
(2d Cir. 1974).
38. See Note, supra note 3, at 564. The business judgment rule is inapplicable "when an
objective evaluation of the forces operating to influence the directors at the time of the de-
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less decisions."s Thus, directors may not invoke the business judgment rule
unless they have not have been involved in any alleged misconduct and they
have acted in good faith.40
Use of the Business Judgment Rule to
Dismiss ShareholderDerivativeSuits
Several recent federal cases have relied on the business judgment rule as a
basis for dismissing shareholder derivative suits against a corporation and its
directors.41 Termination of the suit is allowed when those directors who are not
involved in the misconduct or a specially-created committee of such disinterested directors collectively determine that the suit is not in the best business
interests of the corporation. 42 Director disinterestedness is generally an essential
prerequisite to the use of the rule, but establishing such disinterest may be

problematic.
In Burks v. Lasker,45 a group of directors in a registered investment company determined that the corporation should not judicially pursue certain allegations made by two stockholders. The federal district court upheld this
corporate decision, stating that the plaintiff shareholders had failed to meet
their burden of establishing that the minority directors were not disinterested.
cision in question discloses that a real conflict could have existed between forces tending
toward a decision for the advantage of all the shareholders and those tending to the personal
advantage of the directors." Id. But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 283 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (court allowed a special litigation committee to dismiss an action based upon the
manipulation of a stock option plan dearly done to aid the directors as optionees at the expense of the corporation).
39. Ash v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965).
40. All courts allowing dismissal of shareholder actions have found that directors or
members of the litigation committees were disinterested. See cases cited in note 8 supra. The
problem, however, lies with the criteria used by the courts to determine disinterestedness. See
Arsht, supra note 4, at 95-97. The author concluded that if at times the business judgment
rule appears "to excuse deplorable behavior," it is because either the plaintiff or the court
has misapplied the rule and not because the court licenses such behavior.
41. 441 U.S. 471 (1979). Motions to dismiss shareholder suits have been filed under
various provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. E.g., Brooks v. American Export
Indus., 68 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (FED. R. Civ. P. 12(C), motion for judgment on the
pleadings); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa Per Azioni, 69
F.R.D. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (FEo. R. Crv. P. 56, summary judgment).
Compare Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (not allowing dismissal
by directors) with Genzner v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 692 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (allowing
dismissal by directors).
42. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). See, e.g., Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466
F. Supp. 817, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Commentators have repeatedly stated that directors must exercise due care in determining
what course of action is in the corporate best interest. See 3 W. FrLErcrER, supra note 2, §1039,
at 42 n.9 H. HENN, LAW or CORPORATIONS §243 at 482-83 (2d ed. 1970). The majority view is
that directors exercise due care if they give reasonable consideration to each such decision.
Comment, Directors"Failure to Bring Suit, Demand and the Business Judgment Rule, 3 J.
CoRP. L. 208, 211 n.28 (1977).
43. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
44. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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The Second Circuit reversed and took a more pragmatic view of the relationship between independent and non-independent directors.4 5 The court stated
"[i]t is asking too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested directors will view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues
in a situation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals concerned." 46 Moreover, the court
noted it was possible that such considerations would prevent directors from
reaching truly independent decisions even though these directors had acted in
good faith.47 The United States Supreme Court48 reversed the appellate decision based on other considerations, but stated that corporate directors were
9
not absolutely forbidden from terminating non-frivolous shareholder actions.4
50
Support still exists, however, for the Second Circuit's approach.
Courts vary greatly in defining what actions are sufficient to establish the
degree of director self-interest required to bar the use of the business judgment
rule.51 In some cases, a substantial allegation of fraud or lack of good faith
appearing on the face of the complaint is sufficient to infer a lack of disinterestedness. Allegations of negligence may also be adequate to require a hearing
on the merits if they are great enough to imply fraud or willful recklessness.52
However, some courts have held that allegations of participation in an illegal
activity are not sufficient to waive the business judgment rule absent some showing of self-interest or bias.63 Because different jurisdictions have applied varying standards, corporate managements have considered alternative methods of
establishing director distinterestedness to the satisfaction of the courts.
SpecialLitigation Committees
The special litigation committee developed as a method for impartially
monitoring certain corporate activities. 54 The emergence of these committees
45. Burks v. Lasker, 567 F.2d 1208, 1210-12 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Comment, Minority
Directors of a Registered Mutual Fund, Nominated by the Majority Directors as Independent
Directors Pursuant to the Investment Company Act, May Not Terminate a Nonfrivolous
Stockholder's Derivative Action Against the Fund's Majority Directors and its Investment
Advisor, 47 GIN. L. REv. 349, 352-54 (1978).
46. 567 F.2d at 1212.
47. Id. Judge Lumbard pointed out that the independent directors of a mutual fund are
forced to rely on the expert opinion and advice of the non-independent directors and the
investment advisor. Moreover, the directors must work together each day and would therefore
develop ties of loyalty. Such factors make it virtually impossible to have totally disinterested
directors. Id.
48. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
49. Id. at 473.
50. See generally Comment, supra note 45, at 352-54. But see Comment, Mutual FundIndependent Directors Are Not Empowered to Seek Dismissal of a Shareholders-Derivative
Suit Brought Against the Affiliated Directors, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 512, 518 (1979) (circuit court
decision was exteme and unnecessary).
51. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1229-36.
52. See, e.g., Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 83 Misc. 340, 347-51, 144 N.Y.S. 801, 806-08
(Sup. Ct. 1913). See also Note, supra note 3,at 562.
53. See, e.g., Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 701-02 (D. Del. 1966).
54. One commentator has suggested that the Securities and Exchange Commission may
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was also consistent with the widespread practice of allowing corporate executive committees to exercise director powers.55 The special litigation committee
usually meets to investigate a shareholder claim and presumably is composed
of directors who are not involved in the alleged complaint. An interested majority of the board of directors, however, may effectively be permitted to manufacture disinterestedness through its director appointments to these special
committees. 56 Such board members may find these committees particularly
advantageous since they can be formed by virtually any corporation, except
where prohibited by the corporate bylaws.5 7
In Gall v. Exxon Corp.,5s the plaintiff-shareholder brought a derivative
action against Exxon Corporation, its officers and directors, to recover allegedly illegal payoffs made by the defendants to political parties in Italy.59
Upon receiving the plaintiff's demand to sue, the Board of Directors of Exxon,
established a special litigation committee to investigate the allegations and
determine whether legal action should be taken against any former or current
Exxon officers or directors. 60 The committee was composed of three active directors of Exxon 6' and was empowered to act as the full board of directors in
have inadvertently encouraged the development of special litigation committees. See note,
supra note 8, at 608.
55. For a discussion of the rise in popularity of the delegation of the powers of the board
of directors to executive committees, see W. CARY, supra note 2, at 810-17. For further background on executive committees, see generally Mylander, Management by Executive Committee, 33 HARv. Bus. R.v. 51 (1951).
56. In the majority of decisions, courts have restricted their examination of the committee to the committee's methodology, depth of investigation and independence. See, e.g.,
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979), 419 N.Y.S.2d 920. Generally, if
the plaintiff fails to show bias on these points the committee's decision will be immune from
challenge. Note, supra note 8, at 610. For complete discussion of the rise of the special litigation committee see id. at 608-16.
57. The directors may not form such a special litigation committee where it is expressly
forbidden by the corporation's bylaws, or where the bylaws do not provide for executive committees. In Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), one of the first cases inVolving the use of such a committee, the court even reproduced the applicable section of
Exxon Corp.'s bylaws which allowed such actions. Id. at 510 n.1.
58. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
59. Id. at 509-14.
60. The resolution creating the committee stated its exact purposes and powers. The
committee was empowered to do three things: (1) conduct the investigation into all matters
referred to in the demand by the shareholders; (2) make a determination as to whether the
action should be pursued; and (3) supervise any actions deemed necessary Id. at 510-11.
61. The committee was composed of Jack F. Bennett, who was a senior vice-president of
Exxon as well as a director, and two outside directors. The two outsiders were Richard Dobson, chairman and executive officer of British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd. and Edward
Harness, chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Proctor & Gamble Corp. Id.
This is the typical make-up of such committees. The outsiders on these committees are
almost always directors or officers of other major corporations. It is also quite common for
well known members of the bar to serve as special counsel to these committees. See, e.g., Lasker
v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (retained Stanley H.
Fuld, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 508, 514 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (retained Joseph Weintaub, former Chief Justice of the
New Jersey Supreme Court).
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matters within its mandate.6 2 After an extensive investigation, the committee
concluded that further pursuit of the action would not be in the best interests
of the corporation.63 Among the factors cited in the committee's decision to
dismiss were: the cost of the suit, the potential consequences of failure, the
interruption of business, and the undermining of personnel morale. 64 The committee, however, seemed to ignore the fact that seven of thirteen named de65
fendants knew of the illegal payments.
Prior to the development of special litigation committees, courts had restricted the boards' authority to decide whether to pursue shareholder claims
where a majority of board members were connected with the alleged wrongdoing.6 Such committees, however, have become an increasingly popular
7
method of handling alleged disputes involving corporate director activities.6
Most courts erroneously assume that state law gives directors the authority to
create special litigation committees.68 Judicial approval of these committees has
made it possible for a minority of outside directors to protect their colleagues
from personal liability for corporate misdeeds. 9 Some boards have gone so far
as to appoint new members for the sole purpose of sitting on these committees. 70 The potential for director manipulation through these special litigation

committees has, therefore, become virtually limitless.
In adhering to the committee decisions, the courts have generally failed to
consider what one commentator has recently labeled the "structural bias" approach.7 1 This approach suggests that the members of special litigation committees should not be presumed to be impartial since other factors unavoida62. 418 F. Supp. at 510-11.
63. The investigation continued for four months and involved interviews with over 100
witnesses. The report contained 32 pages summarizing the committee's findings of fact and
recommendations. Id. at 511. For results of the investigation see id. at 511-14.

64. Id. The problem with such a rationale is that if taken to an extreme, it could be
used to dismiss all litigation by shareholders. At least in the short run, it would seem likely

that any suit involving the corporate officers or directors would be costly for the corporation,
either directly or indirectly. Likewise such a suit will normally do little to boost corporate
morale. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1237. For a brief summary of reasons that courts have
accepted in upholding directors' disapproval of suits see S. Solomon & Sons Trust, Inc. v.
New England Theatres Operating Corp., 325 Mass. 99, 108, 109, 93 N.E.2d 241, 246 (1950).
65. 418 F. Supp. at 512-14. See Comment, supra note 42, at 210-11.
66. See, e.g., Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 15-19, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42 (1912);
Montgomery Light Co. v. Lahey, 121 Ala. 131, 135-37, 25 So. 1006, 1008 (1899).
67. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. General
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1978); Rosengarten v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 821-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
68. Note, supra note 8, at 617-29.
69. One solution available to defendant directors is to expand the board and appoint new
directors to the committee who cannot be disqualified because they were not in office at the
time of the transaction. Coffee, supra note 1, at 1230. However, if the courts are not careful,
such appointments could become a handsome reward for a proper vote.
70. Such a change in the composition of the board has been held to make demand necessary even where it was previously excused as futile. See Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d
932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. Note, supra note 8, at 619-26.
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bly limit such impartiality. In particular, the commentator notes that there are
certain structural, financial, psychological, and social attachments among corporate directors which undercut any presumption of automatic disinterestedness.7 2 The Fifth Circuit became the first court to officially recognize this theory
in Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton FinancialCorp.73 In that case, the shareholders

of Booth, Inc. brought a derivative action against a corporate shareholder, and
the president of Booth, the corporation's largest stockholder.7 4 The complaint
alleged that a previous corporate merger had been effected through various
securities frauds. 75 Joined by other named defendants, the directors of Booth
petitioned the court for dismissal of the suit.76 Upon denial of this motion, the
directors of Booth negotiated and reached a settlement with other Booth shareholders without consulting the plaintiffs.7 Plaintiffs subsequently challenged
this settlement in federal district court, but the court determined that Booth's
directors were disinterested, and that the compromise was reasonable.7 8
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court on appeal.79 Referring to the
structural bias theory, the Clark court suggested that the directors' control over
corporate litigation presupposed that the Booth directors were not disinterested.80 Because Booth's charter prohibited cummulative voting, every director
who ratified the settlement was elected by the combined vote of the two defendants, the two largest shareholders in the Booth corporation. 81 The court
apparently concluded that since the other directors served at the sufference of
bias existed which was sufficient to make
these majority leaders, a structural
82
Booth's directors interested.
The rationale of the Clark decision could be extended to the area of special
litigation committees. Just as the directors in Clark were potentially controlled
by the majority shareholders, the members of special litigation committees
may serve at the discretionary will of the board. Therefore, sufficient structural
bias may exist to raise questions concerning the disinterestedness of committee
members.
The Board'sDecisionNot To Sue

The legal effect of a decision by a board of directors, not to bring suit is
currently unsettled. In the Delaware decision Sohland v. Baker,83 a shareholder
72. Id.
73. 625 F.2d 49,53 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 51-52.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 51.
77.

Id.

78. Id. at 51-52.
79. Id. at 53.
80.

Id.

81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 53. See N. LATrN, CORPORATIONS 239 (2d ed. 1971). This is so for many reasons
including their knowledge of the inner workings of the corporation, the knowledge of the
current proxy control situation, and in many situations their established affiliation with other
corporate insiders.
83. 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (1927).
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sought cancellation and an accounting of certain stocks issued in the names of
the defendants.8s The court found that if the directors refused to sue after sufficient demand had been made upon them then, the shareholder could proceed
independently with the suit.s5 The court concluded the reasons for such refusal
to sue were irrelevant, and that, therefore, the right to bring suit vested in the
plaintiff shareholder86
The Sohland view is not a unanimous interpretation.7 Some commentators
have argued that courts should find the directors' refusal to sue is indefensible
before allowing the shareholders to proceed independently.8 This restrictive

84. Id. at 432-33, 141 A. at 277-81.
85. Id. at 443, 141 A. at 282. The court stated the generally accepted rule that, "a cause
of action belonging to a corporation can be asserted only by such corporation by a suit in the
corporate name." The court, however, went on to find that, "conditions exist ... whereby a
stockholder may sue in his own name for the purpose of enforcing corporate rights .. " The
conditions which allow such an action by the shareholder exist where after proper demand
the corporation refuses to sue. Id. at 441, 141 A. at 281.
The court also made it clear that shareholders needed a means to enter the court system
to protect themselves. The court stated that: "While the conclusion may be drawn that the
corporate management was not hostile to action by the complainant, the fact, nevertheless,
remains that the corporation itself refused to litigate an apparent corporate right. The reasons
for such refusal need not be considered. The corporation, having refused to institute proceedings, the only way that its rights could be brought before the court was by a bill filed by
a stockholder. That the complainant, for the prevention of injustice, therefore, had the right
to file the bill in the court, seems clear." Id. at 282.
86. Id. at 443, 141 A. at 282. Accord, Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974). Papilsky suggested that once the exhaustion requirement had
been satisfied, either by a refusal of the corporation to act after demand or by a determination that demand is not required, shareholders may bring a derivative action. But see Note,
supra note 18, at 191-92 where it was suggested that "the better view is that shareholders may
not maintain a derivative action until they have demonstrated their standing to sue."
This standing requirement has been referred to as the "sine qua non of the stockholder's
derivative xight to sue." Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
87. E.g. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957), where the court found the
board's mere refusal to act upon demand did not, ipso facto, clear the way for a suit by the
shareholder. Id. at 858. The court also found that unless an equitable basis for interference
is shown, stockholders have "no more right to challegene by a derivative suit a decision by
the board of directors not to sue than to so challenge any other decision by the board." Id.
at 859. See, H. BALLANTINE, supra note 2, at 349, where it was stated that a decision by the
directors not to sue, "is a bar to the beginning of a derivative suit by a shareholder." See also
United States Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); Klotz
v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 577, 581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
88. See Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcements, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 143,
144 n.6 (1961). See also N. LArsN, supra note 82, at 349-52 (1959). Recognizing that standing
is the threshold question, several district courts have either ordered separate trials or limited
discovery on the standing issue. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Financio-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(b) authorizes separate trials only "in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and
economy." Implicit in rule 42(b) is the power to limit discovery to segregated issues. Ellingson
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view appears to be the prevailing view of the federal courts.89 Consequently,
directors may be able to use the business judgment rule in federal court to bar

shareholders from initiating deriavtive actions when the corporation has refused to sue.90

The Misapplicationof the Business Judgment
Rule in the FederalCourts
Federal courts applying the business judgment rule must generally follow
the law of the state of incorporation in determining whether disinterested directors have the power to terminate derivative suits. 91 In the recent decision
Burks v.Lasker,9 2 the United States Supreme Court established a two-pronged
inquiry to determine the permissibility of such a dismissal. The threshold
question was whether the applicable state law permited independent directors
to terminate the suits. 98 If state law allowed dismissal, the second consideration
was whether dismissal of the suit was consistent with all federal law upon which
the action was based. 94 Where state laws significantly impacted upon the enTimber Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co., 424 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
See Note, supra note 18, at 199.
89. But see Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court suggested
diflerent standards of interestedness apply to cases where the plantiff has made no demand
and those in which a demand has been made and rejected. Id.
90. Although some courts may excuse demand altogether, if the plaintiff proves that a
minority of interested directors control the board, the courts generally allow a majority of
disinterested directors to terminate a suit against a minority of alleged wrongdoers. Note,
supra note 8, at 606-07. See, e.g., Calef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Abrams
1974). But see Boyko v. Reserve
v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361, 369-70 (N.D. Ill.
Fund Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("where there is at least one affiliated or interested director on the board of a mutual fund, the futility of demand on the entire board will
be presumed'; Bayne, A Flaw in the Law: The Demand Rule: A Brief, 22 ST. Louis L.J. 69,
80 (1978).
91. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975);
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1948). See also Coffee, supra note 1,
at 1224 n.455-56.
92. 441 U.S. 471 (1979). This suit was instituted by the shareholders of Fundamental
Investors, Inc., a mutual fund, to recover losses suffered by the fund as a result of its purchase of twenty million dollars in Penn Central Transportation Co. short term notes. Seven
months later Penn Central filed for bankruptcy. The shareholders alleged that the directors
had violated their duties under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-1 to 52
(1976), and certain common law principles regarding commercial paper. For a discussion: of
the Investment Company Act and the special problems related to mutual funds see generally
Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 181 (1961). For a discussion
of the duties of directors under the Investment Company Act see generally Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799 (1976);
Lipton, Directors of Mutual Funds: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1976); Nutt, A
Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1971); Radmer, Duties
of the Directors of Investment Companies, 3 J. CORP. L. 61 (1977); Comment, Duties of the
Independent Directorin Open-End Mutual Funds, 70 MicH. L. Ilv. 696 (1972).
93. 441 U.S. at 474.
94. Id. at 476. The Court cited J.I Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) which stated:
"the overriding federal law applicable here would, where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress despite the provisions of state corporation law .... Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

DVol. XXXIII

95
forcement of federal rights, federal law would prevail.
Due to the federal courts' disregard or misinterpretation of state law, different results have been reached when federal and state courts purport to apply
the same law to the same facts. An example of such a conflict appears in the
6
two separate opinions of Maldonado v. Flynn.9 A minority shareholder in
Maldonado, brought a derivative suit claiming that the directors of Zapata
Corporation had avoided substantial federal tax liability at the expense of the
corporation by accelerating the date upon which their stock options could be
exercised.9 7 Zapata's directors subsequently formed an independent investiga-

95. 441 U.S. at 476.
96. 485 F. Supp. 274, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). The action
was first brought in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1978,
where it was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp.
1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Court of Appeals affirmed, except as to the plaintiff's claim that
misleading proxy materials were used in a subsequent director election. Maldonado v. Flynn,
597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). The plaintiff filed an amended complaint based upon the same
facts but alleging only a single cause of action for violations under §14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act. The claim in the state court of Delaware was based upon a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duty to the corporation. 413 A.2d at 1254. The suits in both jurisdictions
were based upon the same set of facts which were not in dispute. Therefore, the facts
enumerated will be taken from both decisions in an effort to give a complete understanding of
the situation.
Adding to the confusion, the Delaware Chancery Court was recently forced to reconsider
its decision in Maldonado and has dismissed the action on res judicata grounds. Maldonado v.
Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 380. Therefore, the precedential value of the Delaware Court's original
decision in Maldonado is questionable. See, e.g., Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 358
(S.D. Tex. 1980) (federal district court relied heavily on the Delaware Chancery Court decision in Maldonado). Although the Delaware version of Maldonado is technically invalid, it
was invalidated on procedural grounds and the court's reasoning will most likely still carry
considerable force and weight.
97. 413 A.2d at 1254-55. In 1970, the board of directors adopted a stock option plan in
which certain Zapata officers and directors were granted options to purchase common stock
installments. Prior to the exercise of the final option installments, however, Zapata planned a
tender offer for 2,300,000 of its shares which was predicted to increase the market value of
the stock. Zapata's directors, most of whom were optionees, realized that substantial additional
tax liability would be incurred if their options were exercised after the tender offer announcement. Therefore, the directors modified the stock option plan to allow acceleration of
the date at which the option could be exercised. The amendments to the stock option plan
applied only to Zapata's six senior officers. 597 F.2d at 792. Four of the six senior officers were
also directors of Zapata. Id. at 791 n.l. Three resolutions were adopted by the board of directors in connection with the modification of the stock option plan. One resolution accelerated the exercise date of the final option from July 14, 1974 to July 2, 1974. The other two
resolutions modified the plan to authorize the corporation to make interest-free loans to the
six optionees in the amount of the purchase price for the options exercised and for tax
liability incurred as a result of their exercising the options. 597 F.2d at 792.
The board made these amendments to the plan contingent upon shareholder approval.
For some unexplained reason, however, the modifications were never submitted to the
shareholders. Id. The defendant optionees denied the shareholder's allegations and asserted
that any such deduction would have been minimal or nonexistent due to operating and
capital loss carrybacks which were available to the corporation. 413 A.2d at 1255.
Note that this suit was against the corporate directors rather than against a third party.
Thus, the directors had a direct stake in its outcome. Such may not be the case when shareholders seek to enforce the corporation's rights against third parties because the directors may
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five committee 8 composed of two ostensibly independent outside directors. 99
After an investigation of the minority shareholder's allegations, the committee
determined the litigation was contrary to Zapata's best interests and recommended dismissal of all pending suits.100 The federal district court consequently
granted a dismissal of the suit, holding that the directors had the authority to
use their business judgment in refusing to pursue the shareholder's claims. 0°1
Shortly thereafter, the Delaware Chancery Court arrived at a contrary result on
identical facts, finding the business judgment rule contained no independent
1 02
grant of power to dismiss such suits.
In both Maldonado decisions, the courts appropriately referred to the Burks
decision as the foundation for their analysis.10 3 The two Maldonado courts
started with the Burks proposition that federal courts must apply state law.10 4
The courts, however, took divergent paths in their interpretation of the substantive law of Delaware. The New York federal district court stated that the Delaware courts had not faced the precise issue of whether disinterested directors
may terminate derivative suits.1 05 Consequently, the court turned to an Eighth
0
Circuit decision 06 which held that Delaware law permitted such dismissal.3'
The Delaware Chancery Court, on the other hand, cited Sohland v. BakerOS
have no personal stake in the outcome. The courts have been misled by the superficial similarity between these two forms of derivative action and consequently have indiscriminately
applied the business judgment rule to both. Note, supra note 8, at 603-08.
98. 413 A.2d at 1255. This committee was formed nearly four years after Maldonado filed
his complaint. The committee was authorized to investigate the claims of both the state and
federal actions and take any course of action it deemed appropriate. Id.
99. It is not clear whether these two newly appointed directors were appointed because of
a lack of other disinterested directors. At the time of the modification of the stock option
plan, the board had four directors who were non-employees and thus ineligible to be optionees. The directors who were optionees did not participate directly in the meeting and did
not vote on the modification of the plan. 597 F.2d at 791-92.
100. 413 A.2d at 1255.
101. 485 F. Supp. 274, 283.
102. 413 A.2d at 1263.
103. 485 F. Supp. at 283.
104. See text accompanying notes 91-95 supra. Both courts point out that no Delaware
court had previously considered the exact issue faced in Maldonado, 485 F. Supp. at 278, 413
A.2d at 1257. The Delaware court further found no statutory authority addressing the question. However, the Delaware court, relying upon other Delaware case law, found the answer
to the issue in state court interpretation of the business judgment rule. Id.
105. 485 F. Supp. at 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court cited Delaware law which recognized
the business judgment rule but based its ultimate decision on other federal case law. Id.
The district court found it insufficient for the plaintiff to merely allege that the directors
were interested or lacked good faith. The court held that a showing of fact was necessary to
find the directors interested and thus remove the decision from them. Id. at 284.
106. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1070 (1980).
107. The Abbey decision failed to cite any Delaware cases allowing the application of the
business judgment rule to dismiss derivative suits where the directors were charged with misdoings. The court did, however, cite the Delaware case of Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160
A.2d 731 (1960) which found that the internal affairs of Delaware corporations are controlled
by Delaware law.
108. 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (1927). See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
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for the proposition that the shareholder possesses an independent right to bring
a derivative suit in the corporation's name. 10 9 Because of this right, the directors could not invoke the business judgment rule as an independent grant of
authority with which to dismiss derivative suits.110 The authority to terminate
such a suit, if it existed at all, must be found outside the business judgment
rule.1 '
The contradictory Maldonado decisions indicate that federal courts facing
this issue may have to make broad assumptions concerning the proper interpretation of state law.11 2 Few state courts, however, have spoken directly on the
subj ect.113 Consequently, a separate federal common law concerning the application of the business judgment rule has developed despite the established
proscription against developing such federal law." 4 Nevertheless, federal courts
109. 413 A.2d at 1260. The Delaware court concluded that Sohland, standing alone, was
probably sufficient to deny Zapata's motion for dismissal. The court also pointed out that
neither party had cited Sohland. Id. at 1261.
110. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1257-61. The court reasoned that the "[nature of
the derivative suit] not the existence of the business judgment rule, determines whether the
directors of a Delaware corporation have the authority to prevent the stockholders from
bringing or continuing a cause of action to enforce a corporate right of action against the
corporate directors for breach of fiduciary duty when the corporation refuses, explicitly or by
implication, to bring the action." Id.
The Delaware court in Maldonado also concluded that once a shareholder has demanded
that the corporation sue for a proper cause and has been met with refusal, "he may assert his
individual right and the corporate right together in a derivative suit, and the corporation no
longer controls the corporate right to which the plaintiff's individual right attaches." Id. at
1262. See also 3 C. POMEROY, POMEROY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §1095 (1970).
111. 413 A.2d at 1257. The court classified the business judgment rule as, "merely a presumption of propriety accorded decisions of corporate directors." Id. The court went on to
conclude that the rule, "provides a shield with which directors may oppose stockholders'
attacks on the decisions made by them." Id. The court further found that what the business
judgment rule was not, was an independent grant of authority to dismiss derivative suits. Id.
112. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1979).
In Lewis the court summed up the problem that exists in attempting to determine state
law by stating: "The California Supreme Court has never faced the issue presented here; we
therefore 'sit as a state court' and look for guidance from intermediate appellate courts in
California, and from courts in other jurisdictions which have recently considered the question." Id.
The Court in Burks was proceeding on a federal cause of action under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 §1, 15 U.S.C. §80a-1 (1976) and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940
§201, 15 U.S.C. §80b-I (1976); therefore their decision was not made under Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and state law does not operate of its own force. 441 U.S. at 476.
For a further explanation see Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum.
L. REv. 489, 529 (1954).
113. At this time it appears that only the Delaware Chancery Court has spoken directly
on the subject in Maldonado.
114. The landmark decision Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) established that
federal courts must generally apply state substantive law except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or Acts of Congress. The Erie decision also stated that there is no federal general common law. Nevertheless, a type of federal common law has developed as the
result of the federal courts relying upon pre-Erie decisions concerning the powers of directors.
Since no state courts have spoken on the subject until recently, the pre-Erie based federal
common law has continued to be applid in fhV federal sphere.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss4/6

16

Higbee: The Misapplication of the Business Judgement Rule to Dismiss Shar

1981]

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

have continued to follow previous federal decisions concerning the application
of the business judgment rule even though state law should be the controlling
precedent. 115
The errors resulting from the federal courts' reliance upon federal rather
than state law has been compounded by their tendency to misinterpret the
relevant federal law. Even the federal precedents do not appear to support dis18
missal of derivative actions in a case like Maldonado."
For example, in the
oft-cited opinion Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., " 7 the Supreme
Court dismissed a shareholder's suit to enjoin the collection of a tax from a
corporation. 1 8 The Court held that the shareholder lacked standing to bring
the suit since the corporation itself would not have been entitled to an injunction.1 9 Therefore, the dismissal in Corbus was predicated upon the legal impossibility of the suit. Additionally, the plaintiff in Corbus did not allege that
1
the directors breached their fiduciary duty or acted for their own gain, 20
whereas the directors in Maldonado were accused of corporate misconduct.
The landmark decision Hawes v. Oakland'2 ' has also been misused to support the dismissal of shareholder suits. The complaintant in Hawes sought to
compel the City of Oakland to pay for water services that were being
gratuitously provided by the corporation. 22 The Court stated that the directors
could reasonably have determined this public service was in the best interests
of the corporation, and therefore the business judgment rule insulated the
directors' decision. 23 Unlike Maldonado, the business judgment rule was used
in Hawes as a defense to the allegations in the complaint, not to terminate the
suit before it began. 2 4 Moreover, the complaint contained no allegations of
fraud or misconduct on the part of the directors. Consequently, although
Hawes, Corbus and similar federal decisions resulted in the dismissal of share115. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1223-24. Three of the most frequently cited Supreme
Court decisions are: United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917);
Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U.S. 450 (1881). For a discussion of these cases see text accompanying notes 116-125 infra.
116. In Maldonado, the directors themselves were charged with wrongdoing. This factor
was not present in the frequently-cited pre-Erie decisions.
117. 187 U.S. 455 (1903).
118. Id. at465.
119. This distinguishing factor was pointed out by the Delaware Court in Maldonado.
413 A.2d at 1258.
120. Id. Only the government could have gained from the situation. The directors were
preparing to pay a tax to the government upon which the shareholder objected. In effect, the
shareholder wanted the directors to do something they could not legally do.
121. 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
122. Id. at 451. The city had only been given permission to use the water free of charge
"in case of fire or other great necessity," however, they had used it for various other municipal
services. It was the contention of the directors of the Waterworks Co. that it would not be in
their long-run best interests to sue the city. Id. at 451-53.
123. This is actually the precise interpretation of the business judgment rule. The directors were taking a business risk that allowing the city to have this water would be of longterm corporate benefit.
124. Although the case was dismissed, both sides had had time to perform necessary discovery even though no formal discovery rules were in effect. Id. at 450-56.
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holder suits, these precedents may not be applicable to factually dissimilar
cases like Maldonado.-r
In applying the business judgment rule to shareholder derivative suits, federal courts have also failed to distinguish between suits in which a third party
is the defendant and suits in which the directors are the defendants. Where the
alleged wrong directly results from some questionable director action, the application of the rule may be less justifiable than where third parties are accused of misdoings.26 Allowing the directors to dismiss shareholder suits against
corporate defendants may effectively permit the misfeasants to act as judges in
in their own case.

27

The potential inequity of permitting corporate defendants to impede derivative actions becomes particularly apparent when considered in light of the
shareholder demand requirement and the accompanying "futile" exception.
The demand requirement mandates that the shareholders show they have requested the directors to pursue the alleged complaint and that the directors
have refused.128 An exception to the demand requirement exists where the shareholders indicate that demand would be futile because of director self-interest.129
125. See also United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917),
which stands for the proposition that a shareholder may not bring a derivative action against
an extracorporate defendant where no allegation has been made that the directors acted improperly in refusing to sue.
Despite the apparent misapplication of pre-Erie cases, modern federal courts have continued to cite these pre-Erie cases as a basis for director power. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson,
615 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259,
274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Ash v. International Bus. Mach. Inc.,
353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp.
817, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 577, 581
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
126. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
127. If the business judgment rule is given automatic application, the rule could degenerate into a ritualistic incantation designed to ward off liability. Weingard v. Atlantic
Say. & Loan Ass'n, I Cal. 3d 806, 818-19, 464 P.2d 106, 112, 83 Cal. Rptr. 650, 656 (1970); Note,
supra note 8, at 605-06.
A further problem exists where interested directors approve a derivative suit, because [i]t
would he the height of folly to entrust the conduct of the litigation .. . to the very people
who are responsible for the wrongs." Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 489, 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1942). In such a case, justice would be attained only where shareholders control the

suit.
The failure of directors or officers to act on behalf of the corporation can often be more
damaging than improper action. For example, in Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 507
F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1974), stockholders brought a derivative suit against AT&T and all but one
of its directors. The suit was based upon the failure of AT&T to collect an outstanding debt
incurred for communications services provided during the 1968 Democratic National Convention owed by the Democratic National Committee. Such inaction was made illegal under the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. §610 (1970). Nevertheless, the complaint
was dismissed because it lacked specificity.
A board of directors' disapproval of a derivative action against unrelated third parties
should require less justification than a refusal to sue corporate insiders. Coffee, supra note 1,
at 1238. See also Note, supra note 8, at 603-08.
128. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
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In Smith v. Sperlingy30 the United States Supreme Court noted that demand
is futile when the board of directors is antagonistic to the shareholder derivative action.131 Where demand is found to be futile, the directors are to some
degree interested. 1 2 Application of the business judgment rule, however, presupposes the existence of disinterested directors.133 Therefore, where demand is
found to be futile,3 4 directors should not be permitted to use the business judgment rule to avoid shareholder suits. 33
Another troublesome aspect of the federal trend in applying the business
judgment rule to dismiss shareholder derivative suits is that the trend seems inconsistent with the corporate ratification doctrine. Generally speaking, this
doctrine permits shareholders to ratify and thereby legitimatize certain unauthorized management decisions. Substantial case law, however, supports the
proposition that even a dearly disinterested majority of shareholders can not
ratify illegal managerial conduct.13 6 If the shareholders can not ratify these
illegal acts, it may be inappropirate to allow the directors to invoke the business
judgment rule and perhaps release the perpetrators from liability by declining
to sue them.1 37 One commentator has noted that "[a]t least from the standpoint
130. 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
131. Id. at 101.
132. This principle is true unless the Smith rule, is taken to its most extreme conclusion,
at which point any indication that the directors might not sue would make demand futile.
Justice Frankfurter stated that the majority in Smith was overturning half a century of
Supreme Court precedent. 354 U.S. at 98 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). However, many courts
adhere to Justice Frankfurter's "conflict of interest" definition of futility. See Gall v. Exxon
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc.,
353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966) (cited with approval in
Gall).

133. The business judgment rule will be applied only when an objective evaluation of
the context surrounding a decision indicates that forces influencing the judgment of the
decision-makers uniformly tended to motivate a decision for the benefit of all shareholders.
JudicialRestraint,supranote 3,at 564.

134. According to the majority in Smith, mere opposition by a board of directors to a
derivative suit will render demand futile even if good business reasons were cited by the
board for refusing to bring the suit. However, this lenient standard of futility is not accepted by all courts. In a lengthy dissent in Smith, Justice Frankfurter found the majority's
view far too mechanical. He defined antagonism by looking to the parties involved and found
the all important determination to be the relation of the parties to the corporation. The
Justice was unwilling to accept the approach which found demand automatically futile where
directors opposed the suit. Id. at 110.
135. See Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Coffee, supra note 1, at 1229-30; Demand & Standing, supra note

18, at 173-82.
136. See Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 305 F-.2d 297
(3d Cir. 1962) (where the court indicated that even a dearly disinterested majority of the
shareholders may not ratify illegal or fraudulent acts). This problem arises generally with
regard to the question of demand on shareholders. The majority of courts have held that
where the attacked transaction is nonratifiable, demand on shareholders is excused. See, e.g.,
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-20, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42 (1912). Such decisions
are based upon language like that in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881) where the
court found that demand should be made on shareholders unless it was "not reasonable to
require it." Id. See also Note, supra note 3,at 185-90.
137. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 197-98 (2d Cir. 1959); Mayer
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of internal consistency, it seems incongruous that disinterested directors have
powers denied the disinterested owners of the corporation who appointed
them."' 8 Furthermore, a claim that the decision not to sue realistically differs
from a decision to ratify the underlying conduct elevates form over substance. 39
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question of ratification in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.14 In that case, a shareholder questioned the constitutionality of various contracts between the Alabama Power
Company and the Tennessee Valley Authority. 14' Although the Court found
that the contracts were constitutional, the justices disagreed as to whether allowing directors to obtain dismissal of derivative suits amounted to ratification
of an illegal act. Chief Justice Hughes and three concurring justices concluded
that the business judgment defense did not operate where the complaint alleged illegal conduct by corporate management. 42 Justice Brandeis and three
other justices concurred in the result, but stated that the issue of illegality was
irrelevant because "shareholders are not the guardians of the public."'1 3 Justice
Brandeis also noted that guarding the public from illegal acts was the responsibility of public officials.1 44 Justice Brandeis' opinion appears to have become
the prevailing standard in contemporary federal courts. 145 This standard seems
v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 301, 141 A.2d 458, 460 (1958). Directors are in effect the shareholders' agents or representatives for deciding matters of corporate concern. Consequently,
directors derive their power through the shareholders.
138. Coffee, supranote 1, at 1223.
139. Id. To further heighten this anomaly, virtually all recent decisions upholding the
business judgment defense have come from federal courts. See note 8 supra. However, almost
all cases holding illegal acts nonratifiable have come from state courts. See, e.g., Parish v.
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 102-05, 242 A.2d 512, 556-57 (1968); Groel
v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (1905). See also Coffee, supra note 1, at 1223
n.452.
140. 297 U.S. 288 (1935).
141. Id. The contracts were for a $1,000,000 purchase of certain transmission lines, substations and auxiliary properties. Also included in the contracts were the purchase of some
real property and the sale of Alabama Power's surplus power to the government through the
T.V.A. A shareholders derivative suit challenged the contracts as illegal on constitutional
grounds. Id. at 315-18.
142. Chief Justice Hughes was joined by Justices Van Devanter, Butler and Sutherland.
The Chief Justice's opinion stated "that if the directors were guilty of yielding, without appropriate resistance, to governmental demands that were unlawful, then the plaintiff was
entitled to protect the corporation from this 'breach of duty' ". Id. at 319. See also Coffee,
supra note 1, at 1225.
143. 297 U.S. at 341-56. Justice Brandesis was joined by Justices Cardozo, Stone and
Roberts. Id. at 343. Brandeis found that: "the fact that the bill calls for an inquiry into the
legality of the transaction does not overcome the obstacle that ordinarily stockholders have
no standing to interfere with the management. Mere belief that corporate action, taken or
contemplated, is illegal gives the stockholder no greater right to interfere than is possessed by
any other citizen." Id. This reasoning, however, fails to consider all of the characteristics of a
"stockholder". Generally, a shareholder in a corporation has more at stake in the decisions
made by that corporation than does the public at large. The shareholder must have some
sure means of protecting his investment.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) where the court said, citing Ashwander: "[t]he plaintiffs also contend that the
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to promote the incongruous result of allowing dismissal where defacto ratification exists.246

The federal trend towards granting motions to dismiss derivative suits is
also subject to criticism because of the courts' timing in granting such motions.147 The dismissal of shareholder actions usually occurs shortly after initiation of the suit but prior to any discovery into the merits of the allegations.145
Many courts require a showing that the directors were involved in some wrongdoing before shareholders can defeat a motion for dismissal.149 The information
necessary for this showing, however, is often in the possession of the corporation and its directors. 50 Without extensive discovery, it is virtually impossible

business judgment rule does not permit ratification of illegal acts. This argument misses the
point. A derivative action is designed to redress wrongs to the corporation and not wrongs to
the public. If the directors legitimately determine that such an action will not benefit the
corporation, then, regardless of the illegality of the underlying transaction, the business
judgment rule permits termination of the suit." Id. The Rosengarten court in fact cited page
343 of Ashwander which is the dissenting part of Brandeis' concurrence.
146. There has been a split in the interpretation of Ashwander by the courts. The court
in Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
proposed a very restrictive interpretation, limiting Ashwander's applicability to situations in
which the statute [upon which the litigation is based] is itself unconstitutional, as opposed to
cases of unconstitutional action by state officials under a valid statute. Conversely, Ashwander's
reasoning seems implicit in Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974),
where it was found that it would be illegal not to sue. Coffee, supranote 1, at 1225 nA61.
147. The timing question must be dealt with in a manner that is equitable for both the
shareholder and the corporation. If a suit is prematurely dismissed, shareholders might not
be able to obtain sufficient discovery to build their case and potentially meritorious claims
might be lost. On the other hand, if meritless suits are dismissed too late, the corporations
may be unnecessarily injured.
148. This problem has prompted some to call for separate trials on the standing requirement. Note, supra note 18, at 198-200. Several federal district courts have called for such
separation or for discovery limited to that issue. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp.
508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziar-Societa Per
Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
149. See, e.g., Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966).
150. This is the root of the problem of allowing the corporation, through its directors or
a committee of directors, to carry out their own investigation and make an irrevocable decision to terminate the litigation. The problem is that neither the court nor the plaintiff may
compel the directors or their committee to disclose what considerations were made in reaching
their decision. As the Court of Appeals of New York said in Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979): "[Ihe courts cannot inquire as to which factors
were considered by [a special litigation committee] or the relative weight accorded them in
reaching that substantive decision .... Inquiry into such matters would go to the very core
of the business judgment made by the committee. To permit judicial probing of such issues
would be to emasculate the business judgment doctrine.... Its substantive evaluation of the
problems posed and its judgment in their resolution are beyond our reach." Id. at 633-34, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 928, 393 N.E.2d at 1002. Directors who wished to insulate their decisions from
shareholders could, therefore, appoint a litigation committee of reputable outside directors
who only had a superficial knowledge of the internal workings of the corporation. The information given to such a committee by the interested parties could thus be less than accurate
or complete and-the courts would be precluded from any inquiry into its nature.
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to show that the directors were involved in the transaction, 15' acted fraudu52

lently, or did not proceed in good faith.1
At least one federal court has allowed limited discovery directed to the
disinterestedness of the members of a special litigation committee. '35 The New
York decision North v. Ringlingl4 suggested that complete discovery should be
conducted before dismissal is permitted. The shareholders in North brought a
derivative action against the managers and directors of Ringling Brothers
Circus for gross negligence in connection with a fire. 155 Although the directors
did not attempt to use the business judgment rule to dismiss the suit, they
argued that the conduct upon which the suit was based was protected by the
business judgment rule. 5- The court declared that since negligence was
charged, the efficacy of the business judgment defense could not be determined
from the face of the complaint.' 57 The court concluded that, "only when the
facts are developed can an appropriate conclusion be reached."' 58 Accordingly,
the North case suggests that without reasonable discovery on the merits of the
case, the courts can not intelligently evaluate the propriety of the corporate
directors' actions. Therefore, to determine accurately what possible conflicts
exist, the plaintiff-shareholders should be given the opportunity to conduct a
sufficient discovery on the merits.
In adopting the federal trend, the courts have effectively subordinated the
basic policy of protecting minority shareholders from management abuses, to
the policy of guarding the corporation from unfounded derivative suits. 159
151. See Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa Per Azioni, 69
F.R.D. 592, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Note, supra note 18, at 175-80 where the commentator points out that mere accusations of director involvement are insufficient to show their
interest. Rather, some factual evidence must be submitted to remove the decision from them.
152. For an example of where lack of good faith has been successfully proven see S.E.C.
v. Zale Corp., Securities Litigation Release No. 8081 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
153. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Gall court only
withheld summary judgment on the directors' decision pending confirmation of their disinterestedness. Id. at 520. See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra. Proper discovery is possibly
more important in suits against directors of a corporation, because most of the evidence
needed to determine whether a director is interested may be found in the records of the
corporation. These records may often be under the control of the accused directors. Thus,
unless discovery of corporate records is allowed, hidden conflicts of interest may go unnoticed.
154. 187 Misc. 621, 63 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Term 1946).
155. Id. at 622, 63 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38.
156. Id., 63 N.Y.S.2d at 138-39.
157. 187 Misc. at 622, 63 N.Y.S.2d at 139-40. For further discussion of this case see Bayne,
supra note 32, at 574-75.
158. 187 Misc. at 622, 63 N.Y.S.2d at 139-40.
159. See Note, supra note 18. Prunty, supra note 6, at 985-92. It seems fairly clear that
favoring one party's interests to the exclusion of the other would be more harmful than
beneficial. The business judgment defense could be degenerated into a ritualistic procedure
by which a servile board, exercising no meaningful judgment, protects its management from
lawsuits. However, the rule protects the corporation's autonomy by allowing the corporation
to decide for itself whether it has been injured. Most importantly, the rule may provide
positive incentive for the board to seek full disclosure of information, since case law clearly
establishes that a release from liability given to a corporate official by an uninformed board
of directors is ineffective. See Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 863-64, 47 Cal. Rptr.
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Corporate directors, however, have a legitimate fear that a shareholder's claim
will actually be a meritless "strike suit"160 brought to harass or embarrass the
corporation and its management. 161 Additionally, while the claim may have
some merit, the costs of litigation,162 the interruption of daily business practices, 6 3 and the commercial disadvantages-6 4 of the suit, may be detrimental to
the corporation.165 Therefore, it might be reasonable for a group of directors
to balance these factors against the probable recovery and conclude that a suit
would not be economically rational. 66
392, 415 (1965); Parish v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 103-05, 142
A.2d 512, 556-58 (1968). See also Coffee, supra note 1, at 1229.
160. See generally Ballantine, Abuses of ShareholderDerivative Suits, 37 CAL. L. Rav. 339
(1949).
161. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Magaziner, 418 Pa. 278, 281, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (1965). Suits that
are not brought in good faith are often referred to as strike suits. A strike suit has been defined as: "shareholder derivative actions begun with [the] hope of winning large attorney fees
or private settlements, and with no intention of benefiting the corporation on behalf of
which suit it was theoretically brought." H. BLAcK, BLACK's LAW DicrIoNpaY 1591 (4th ed.
1968).
But cf. Blake, supra note 88. (a corporate management's general distaste of becoming a
plaintiff in an antitrust suit may heavily influence whether management decides to sue).
Another commentator has noted that such suits are often disfavored by management because they frequently result in a adverse publicity to the corporation. Note, supra note 18, at
759-60 n.81.
162. The litigation costs are both direct and indirect in nature. The direct costs include
any legal fees the corporation may incure in addition to the expenses of its own investigation
and discovery. Even in suits involving only the corporate directors, the corporation is still a
nominal defendant and as such requires representation by counsel. The corporation must also
bear the burden of time and expense required for any plaintiffs discovery into its records.
The indirect costs of shareholder litigation may include the expenses of other party defendants in connection with the suit for which the corporation may become legally liable. See
FLA. STAT. §607.147(3) (1980). Moreover, derivative suits may impair friendly business relations, especially with valued customers and suppliers. See Simon, Must We Sue?, 17 Bus. LAw.
888, 894-95 (1962). See also Blake, supra note 88, at 149.
163. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 (1976).
164. See Blake, supra note 88, at 149; Simon, supra note 163, at 892, 895-96.
165. In many of these suits, the potential recovery for the corporation could amount to a
great deal of money. The corporation may also be entitled to special forms of recovery such
as antitrust treble damages or attorneys fees. Directors should consider the potential for recovering such damages in evaluating shareholder claims. Blake, supra note 88, at 149.
In determining whether a suit is in the best interests of a corporation, directors must
consider the corporation's long-term as well as short-term best interests. This can be especially
important where the alleged wrong is a continuing offense. The cases have often distinguished
decisions not to bring suit where a wrong has admittedly occurred, from a refusal to bring
suit as an invalid attempt to ratify an illegal act. Compare Kessler v. Ensley Co., 123 F. 546,
558 (N.D. Ala. 1903), cert. denied, 205 U.S. 541 (1906) and S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc.
v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 111, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950) with
Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458, 459-60 (Del. 1958) and Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206
N.Y. 7, 14-15, 99 N.E. 138, 141 (1912). For a good discussion of continuing offenses see Blake,
supra note 88, at 150-52.
166. There might be justifiable circumstances, however, where derivative suits would be
proper despite an attendant loss in corporate profits. Modern courts presumably would not
accept the contention that improper actions are in the best interests of the corporation simply
because such actions might be profitable for the corporation. Accord, Ashwander v. Tennessee
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The possibility of meritless or expensive litigation, however, should not
cause the courts to summarily deny the minority shareholder an opportunity
to petition the courts. 167 Other methods are available to curb such abuses which
would adequately safeguard the competing interests of the parties. 168 For example, state laws often impose security-for-expenses bonds, to prevent strike
suits or harassing litigation. 6 9 These bond requirements can be extremely expensive, even to the point of burdening legitimate complaints." o Similarly, the
contemporaneous ownership rule17 1 which requires that the shareholder-plaintiff own stock at the time of the alleged wrong restricts the initiation of strike
suits.

72

These types of legislative innovations or judicial doctrines might better

Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 318-19 (1935) where the court found that a stockholder would
not be denied xelief because of the smallness of his holdings in the corporation.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (where directors of Walt Disney
Productions granted a new stock option plan which was unjustly favorable to their own
interests); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (1974) (where by refusing to sue
to collect a debt owed by the Democratic National Committee, the corporation had in effect
made an illegal domestic polictical contribution); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (where certain directors of Exxon Corp. made payoffs to help assure the election of certain Italian officials).
In the above mentioned situations, some of the wrongful actions taken by the directors
amounted to short-term monetary profits to the corporation. However, long-term involvement
in such activities is likely to cause damage and embarrassment to the corporation and its investors. See also Coffee, supra note 1, at 1237.
167. In the recent decision, Gezner v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 692 (E.D. Mich.
1980). The district court held that dismissal of a shareholder derivative action challenging
overseas payments to foreign officials was proper because shareholders could bring some of
their claims directly. Generally, however, most of these suits involve claims on behalf of the
corporation itself which may not be pursued directly by shareholders. Thus in most cases it
should prove fairly easy to distinguish cases like Gezner.
168. See 13 W. FLErCHER, supranote 2, at §5971.1.
169. Strike suits are now somewhat less of a problem because of the protection provided
by state security-for-expenses statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.147(3) (1980) which states: "If
the . . . plaintiffs hold less than 5 percent of the outstanding shares . . . , then, unless the
stock ... held by such ... plaintiffs shall then have a fair value in excess of $50,000, the court
may at any time before final judgment require the . . . plaintiffs to give security for the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by the corporation in
connection with such action ......
170. For a criticism of the various aspects of security-for-expenses legislation, see generally Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CAL. L.
REv. 128 (1944).
171. The plaintiff in a derivative suit must allege ownership as of the time of the transaction of which he complains and as of the time of bringing suit. 3 J. MooRx & J. KENNEDY,
FEDERAL PRAcrICE f1T23.1.17 to .18 (2d ed. 1980). He must continuously retain his status in the
corporation from the time of the alleged improper acts until after judgment is entered on
the case. Gresov v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 569, 570, 243 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763

(S. Ct. 1960).
172. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.147(1) (1980). Courts also refuse to apply the business judgment rule when the decision not to sue is itself illegal, where there is proof of fraud surrounding the decision or when fear of retribution by an administrative agency motivates the board.
See, e.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1922) (action to have Futures Trading Act adjudged unconstitutional); Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 492 (3d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d
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protect both shareholders and corporate management and thereby avoid unnecessary policymaking by the federal courts.173
CONCLSION
The shareholder derivative suit provides the shareholders with an independent means to protect their investment when corporate channels remain
unresponsive. On the other hand, the business judgment rule protects the
directors from personal liability for business decisions made in good faith.
Corporate directors have used the rule to obtain dismissal of shareholder suits

by claiming that such suits are not in the best business interests of the corporation. An analysis of the policies behind both the derivative suit and the business judgment rule, however, reveals that the business judgment rule is irrelevant to the question of whether the directors have the authority to compel
dismissal. The business judgment rule protects the board's decision to dismiss;
it does not provide independent authority for the dismissal itself.
The federal trend of applying the business judgment rule to shareholder
dismissals potentially enables misfeasant directors to escape liability for their
wrongdoings. Such application of the rule threatens the continuing viability of
the shareholder derivative suit as a means of safeguarding the interests of shareholders. Nowhere else in our legal system will courts enforce a decision which
was reached outside of court, lacked sufficient procedural safeguards and was
based solely upon undisclosed evidence entirely within the control of the defendants. Yet this is precisely what the court does when it allows a special litigation committee appointed by the board of directors to conduct an independent
investigation upon which they may make an irrevocable decision not to pursue
a shareholder action. Even if the members of the special litigation committee
were not involved in any misconduct, they still might not be sufficiently dis-

interested to determine whether their colleagues should be sued.4
Despite the apparently endangered status of the shareholder derivative suit,
the Burks test continues to mandate that the courts apply the relevant state
law on corporate powers. If state courts preempt the area as the Delaware
Chancery Court did in Maldonado, the federal courts will have little choice but
Cir. 1974) (corporation's failure to sue Democratic National Committee for expenses incurred
during political convention held an illegal campaign contribution).
173. Therefore, a balance must be struck between absolute rights accorded the directors

and the rights accorded the shareholders. This balance must take into account the relative
equities and burdens of both directors and shareholders. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1229.

174. Despite the problems in assuring the disinterestednesss of committee members, the
basic theory behind special litigation committees could prove useful to parties involved in

corporate litigation. If restructured, such committees might prove to be a quick, inexpensive
and just means of settling shareholder grievances with the corporate management. In formulating an alternative to the present special litigation committee, some guidance can be gained
from an examination of the structure of many arbitration committees. These committees
consists of one member from each side of the dispute plus an independent third member
agreed upon by both sides. If the special litigation committee was so structured, not only
would the committee's structural bias be eliminated and the shareholders afforded their

needed protection, but the directors would also have an opportunity to expose any insincere
motives of the shareholders and protect the interests of the corporation.
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to follow their lead. As a result, the states could effectively undercut the expanded director powers supported by the federal trend by judicially or statutorily limiting the scope of the business judgment rule.
ALAN HIGBEE
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